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A LANDOWNERS' REMEDY LAI) TO WASTE: STATE PREEMPTION
OF PRIVATE NUISANCE CLAIMS AGAINST REGULATED POLLUTION
SOURCES
KATHLEEN ROTH*
Government control of pollution through the process of review and
permit regulation has the potential to preempt the established common law
remedies that traditionally have been invoked to protect private and public
property interests.' Congress resolved this issue by expressing its intent to
save these causes of action or to preclude them in each environmental
protection statute.2 Thus, by incorporating or excluding common law actions
in federal law, Congress aimed to further the policy of each law to the greatest
extent possible.'
Some states, however, have abandoned this particularized preemption
approach and have experimented in limiting state common law nuisance
. Ms. Roth received her B.S. in government administration from Christopher Newport
University in 1994 and expects to receive her J.D. from the College of William and Mary
School of Law in May of 1997.
These traditional remedies included common law claims of public and private nuisance,
trespass, inverse condemnation, negligence, negligence per se, and strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities. Shay S. Scott, Comment, Combining Environmental Citizen Suits &
Other Private Theories of Recovery, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 369, 380-98 (1994) (citations
omitted) [hereinafter Scott].
When faced with claims of preemption, courts have focused on the precise terms of
the statute involved. See, e.g., Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791, 815 (D.
Idaho 1994) (citing First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152,
180-81 (1946), to support finding that the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. § 791 (1994),
preempts common law claims); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.N.J. 1981)
(holding that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988), preempts common law nuisance claims), aff'd, 688 F.2d
204 (3d Cir. 1982). But see The Lyden Co. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. 1:91CV1967, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19783, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 1991) (citing Wilshire Westwood Assocs.
v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1989), to support its finding that
because CERCLA exempts petroleum products from the definition of "hazardous substances,"
the state nuisance claim for damages was not preempted by the federal statute).
2 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act or CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e)
(1994); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1988); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(0 (1988).
' See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492-93 (1987); S. REP. No. 414,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746.
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actions against permitees operating in compliance with set standards. Some
of these states have chosen to limit the application of nuisance actions to
specified types of sources.4 Alaskan lawmakers have amended their state's
private nuisance statute so that claims are barred against most polluters.5 Still
other states have chosen to apply even broader blanket preemptions so that
courts have interpreted operation in compliance with a pollution permit issued
under a comprehensive regulatory scheme to serve as a bar to common law
nuisance actions.
6
These broad preemptions, aimed at protecting sources of pollution that
operate within the approved standards, far exceed the protection afforded to
polluters by permit-shield provisions and limitations on citizen suits. The
permit-shield provisions and the limitations on enforcement actions brought
by private citizens were designed to prevent frivolous or harassing lawsuits.7
The blanket preemptions, however, eliminate or restrict private nuisance
causes of action that allow private property owners to stop pollution at
harmful levels or to seek compensation for damages to their property caused
by a facility's pollution.' Because permit-shield provisions .and existing
procedural and substantive restraints on lawsuits already adequately protect
polluting interests who comply with regulatory requirements, sweeping
blanket preemptions should not be adopted. The absolute bar imposed on
common law remedies and causes of action for private interests unfairly favors
industrial interests and unnecessarily harms private landowners.
Part I of this Note will discuss the historic significance of the private
nuisance claim in cases of pollution damage. Previous liability limitations for
sources subject to regulation will be analyzed in Part II. Part III will consider
the origin and implementation of across-the-board preemptions of private
4 ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.235 (1995) (barring private nuisance actions against preexisting
agricultural operations that have been in operation for at least three years); OKLA. STAT. tit. 2,
§ 9-210 (1993) (limiting feed yard liability for nuisance actions by creating presumptions
against nuisance for facilities operating within set standards).
A person may not maintain an action under this section based upon an air
emission or water or solid waste discharge, other than the placement of
nuclear waste, where the emission or discharge was expressly authorized by
and is not in violation of a term or condition of ... (2) a license, permit, or
order....
ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.230(b) (1995).
Brown v. County Comm'rs, 622 N.E.2d 1153, 1159 (Ohio App. 1993).
Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.230(b) (1995).
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nuisance claims. Finally, the impact of preempting private nuisance actions
against polluters will be discussed in Part IV.
I. THE HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIVATE NUISANCE ACTIONS IN CASES
OF POLLUTION DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
"Simply stated, a nuisance is a 'wrongful invasion of a right of
interest."' 9  Because nuisance claims were historically used to provide
remedies for landowners adversely affected by actions of their neighbors,"° the
claim was quickly put to use in cases of environmental pollution." The
elements of a private nuisance claim include:
conduct [that] is a legal cause of an invasion of another's
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the
invasion is either (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b)
unintentional and otherwise actionable under rules controlling
liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally
dangerous conditions or activities.' 2
The nuisance claim has been used by private parties in a wide variety
of circumstances including pollution from odors, 3 dust,'4 and various other
interferences.'5 A finding of unreasonable interference allows the court to
award damages or abate the interference.' 6 Thus, nuisance law is a source of
polluter liability to private parties injured by their discharges.
9 Scott, supra note 1, at 381.
10 Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Mich. 1992).
Id. at 720, 725 n.30.
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822.(1979).
'3 E.g., Varjabedian v. City of Madera, 572 P.2d 43 (Cal. 1977).
E.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
15 See Scott, supra note 1, at 382-83 (citing cases for claims relating to blasting, flooding,
stream pollution, odors, smoke, dust, noise pollution, the threat of fire hazard, and "a pond full
of malarial mosquitos").
16 Id. at 382.
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II. EXISTING LIABILITY LIMITATIONS FOR REGULATED SOURCES
A. Permit-Shield Provisions
1. Operation
Federal statutes that provide protection to permitees include the
Refuse Act,17 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),"8 and
Clean Water Act ("CWA"). 9 These provisions decrease the opportunities for
enforcement actions against polluters whose operations are consistent with the
terms of their permits.2" Protection is extended under the Refuse Act so that
sources are also shielded from criminal prosecution where pollution is
occurring within the limitations set by the facility's permit.21 The RCRA
protection bars enforcement actions by federal and state agencies.22
Early cases interpreting these statutes indicate that all enforcement
actions were precluded by these permit-shield rules.2 3 In 1991, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to consider the Environmental
Defense Fund's challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA")
permit-shield regulation.24 The court found no actual controversy because the
EPA had evidently changed its position as to whether enforcement suits by
private attorneys general under the statute's citizen suit provisions were
precluded entirely. 25 EPA briefs indicated that "although [EPA] believes its
permit system will narrow the opportunities for citizen suits, the Agency does
not maintain that the shield precludes [such] suits.26
17 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1994).
18 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988).
19 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
20 Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036, 1041 n. 12 (7th
Cir. 1975); Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1971). Cf Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950
F.2d 741, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding EPA's authority to promulgate permit-shield rules
limiting enforcement actions).
21 Kalur, 335 F. Supp. at 11.
22 Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 762.
23 Id. at 763.
24 Id. (rejecting arguments that the rule conflicted with RCRA's citizen suit provision).
25 Id.
26 Id. Compare previous agency interpretations that the permit-shield rule was preclusive.
45 Fed. Reg. 33,312 (1980).
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2. Rationale
Numerous reasons justifying permit-shields have been offered. One
motivation is to protect industry from uncertainty as to their potential liability
for the effects of their operations. 2' Another consideration is to serve judicial
economy by avoiding a proliferation of unwarranted citizen suits. 2 These
provisions also protect the EPA's authority to issue limitations and permits.29
Permit-shields also conserve limited agency resources by allowing regulating
agencies to focus on pollution sources that have not obtained or complied
with permit requirements.3" Finally, permit-shields arguably will cause the
government to act expeditiously to review sources and issue pending renewal
permits to ensure adequate environmental protection.31 It is argued that the
agency will be spurred to action where the application for renewal is not
processed because the permittee remains protected under older pollution
standards.32 Despite this broad language of intent however, courts have not
extended this defense to sources releasing pollutants pending an initial permit
application approval.3 3 Therefore, permit-shield rules will not protect sources
operating without any permit, even where their emissions meet the
requirements of the statute. 4 Thus, while providing an incentive for agency
efficiency, the rules do not nullify permit requirements.35
These arguments all rest on the assumption that current permit
issuance and enforcement policies and procedures adequately protect the
27 Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 762, 764.
28 NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
29 Glazer v. American Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1039 (E.D. Tex.
1995) (citing Greenpeace v. Waste Technologies Indus., 9 F.3d 1174 (6th Cir. 1993)).
30 Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 762, 764.
31 S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3730.
32 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.6(a), 270.4 (1995); Costle v. Pacific Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 21 0-11
n. 10 (1980); NRDC v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Student Pub. Interest
Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1528, 1538 (D.N.J. 1984),
aff'd, 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985).
" Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168 (D. Mont. 1995); United
States v. Tom-Kat Dev., Inc., 614 F. Supp. 613 (D. Alaska 1985).
3 Beartooth Alliance, 904 F. Supp. 1168.
3 Kitlutsisti v. Arco Alaska, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 832 (D. Alaska 1984). Note, however, that
the court refused plaintiff's request for an immediate injunction where defendants were
operating in compliance with the statute, and EPA had refused to process their individual permit
applications because a former general permit applied. Id.
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public's interest. Because these schemes are organized to protect all parties,
polluters are restrained adeqately and therefore, permit-shield rules do not risk
unchecked harm to private parties. Supporters of permit-shields argue that
permit programs are structured to assure environmental safety through federal
oversight, public participation, strict compliance requirements, and emergency
exceptions.
First, state-run National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permitting programs remain within the scrutiny of the federal
EPA to ensure adequate limitations. The state's authority to administer
permitting of sources is contingent upon the EPA Administrator's approval
of its program.36 Even following approval of the state permitting program,
the protections for citizen interests continue by means of EPA permit reviews
and objections.37 Protection continues throughout the permit's duration.
EPA retains authority to modify, revoke, reissue, or terminate permits. 38 This
authority allows the agency to account for substantial changes in the source's
facility or activities, newly discovered information, changes to the limitation
standards supporting the permit,39 or for other cause.4° Additionally, the EPA
may revise the state program41 or even withdraw program approval for
continuing non-compliance under NPDES. 2 These various provisions all
serve to ensure that the state permitting process is not merely a rubber stamp
on polluters' activities. Given the adequacy of these limitations, supporters
claim that the permit-shield rule does not subject individuals to uncontrolled
dumping.
Second, permits may be issued only after a variety of opportunities for
public input on the allowed limitations. Citizens may influence state effluent
36 State Program Requirements, 40 C.F.R. § 123. 1(c) (1995).
31 Id. § 123.44.
38 Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
3' 40 C.F.R. § 270.41(a) (1995).
" Causes for modification, revocation, or reissuance include: noncompliance with any permit
condition; failure to disclose all relevant facts in the permit application; misrepresentation or
relevant facts at any time; EPA determination that human health or environment is endangered
and can only be reduced to acceptable levels by modification or termination; or, the proposed
transfer of a permit. Id. §§ 270.4 1(b)(2), 270.43.
41 Id. § 123.62.
42 Id. § 123.63 (allowing withdrawal of approval for continuing non-compliance with NPDES
requirements).
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limitations during the state program approval process.43 Individuals also may
affect a particular permit's terms through notice-and-comment review 4 or
participation in the review process of the Regional Administrator. 45  The
stated opportunities for participation in the permitting process balance the
needs of both the public and the source, thus, the permit-shield rule only
enforces the results of this deliberative process.46
Third, strict compliance policies protect the public from abuses of a
source's permit. When a permit has been issued, NPDES policy requires
100% compliance.4 7 A polluter's liability is not limited by the permit-shield
rule for emissions in excess of the limitations approved in the permit.4"
Last, permit-shield rules are not without limits. Emergency exceptions
adequately ensure polluters will not be able to create unmitigated harm due
to the unforeseen impacts of a pollutant.49 For example, under RCRA, the
4' Id. § 123.1 (e) ("Upon submission of a complete program, EPA will conduct a public
hearing, if interest is shown, and determine whether to approve or disapprove the program
taking into consideration the requirements of this part, the CWA and any comments received.").
SE.g., id §§ 124.10-.19; Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
40 C.F.R. § 123.44(d)(3) (1995) (allowing opportunity to comment on the basis of EPA's
objection to a permit); Id. § 123.44(e) (allowing public hearing on request by the state or any
interested person).
46 The effectiveness of public notice and comment is disputed. See Blair P. Bremberg, Pre-
Rulemaking Regulatory Development Activities and Sources as Variables in the Rulemaking
Calculus: Taking a Soft Look at the Ex-APA Side of Environmental Policy Rulemakings, 6 J.
MiN. L. & POL'Y 1, 1 n.2 (1990/1991) (stating that in pre-rulemaking activities involving input
by stakeholders, representation of interests tends to be unbalanced); Id. at 6 (noting the frequent
reopening of rulemaking comment periods in programs subject to active congressional
oversight); Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America's Coastal Zone, 47
MD. L. REv. 358, 389 n. 160 (1988) (observing that comments received on a proposal to release
gypsum into the Mississippi River "was so conflicting, with respect to every pollutant, that it
disposed of nothing").
The ability of the agency to solicit meaningful public participation is limited by the cost
of publicizing notice of hearings and comment periods. David Schnapf, State Hazardous Waste
Programs Under the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 12 ENVTL. L. 679, 743
n.235 (1982) (stating the ability of increased notice requirements to produce meaningful public
comment is questionable). Compare Robert B. Wiygul, The Structure of Environmental
Regulation on the Outer Continental Shelf. Sources, Problems, and the Opportunity for
Change, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 75, 145. "The NPDES permitting
process seems to effectively take state input into account." Id.
" In re Shell Chem. Co., Nos. 85-14, 85-15, 85-16, 1987 WL 120997, at *4 (Oct. 20,
1987).
48 See Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1971); Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 762.
49 Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 765.
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EPA may take action to avoid "imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment."5
B. Limitations on Citizen Suit Standing
1. Operation
The public's ability to enforce environmental protection through
federally authorized citizen suits is limited firther by procedural and
substantive requirements.5 ' All actions must be based on violations of the
governing permit. 52 Plaintiffs must allege "ongoing violations" of the permit
requirements.53 The action may not proceed until after notice is given to both
the polluter and the agency.54 After issuing notice, a potential plaintiff must
wait either sixty or ninety days before commencing the action,55 or the action
will be dismissed absent some extenuating circumstance.5 6 Suits may not be
maintained where the government has taken and diligently pursued corrective
50 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1988); United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th
Cir. 1984) (stating EPA need not prove an emergency exists to prevail).
"' See Save Our Bays and Beaches v. City and County of Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098, 1105
(D. Haw. 1994).
52 Actions may only be brought for violations of actual discharge limitations, rather than water
quality standards. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d
842,850 (9th Cir. 1987); Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 11 F.3d 900, 909-10
(9th Cir. 1993). Citizen suits may not enforce National Ambient Air Quality Standards or an
agreement between the state enforcement agency and the source because CAA provisions are
only enforceable under the citizen suit provision if (1) it falls within the definition of an
"emission standard or limitation," and (2) it is "'in effect under' the Act." Cate v.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 904 F. Supp. 526, 529 (W.D. Va. 1995). But see Sierra
Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Nos. 94-20461, 95-20227, 1996 WL 11077, at *9 (5th Cir. Jan.
11, 1996) (allowing citizen suit although no effluent limitations had been issued based on CWA
§ 1311 (a)).
" Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found. Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56-63 (1987).
54 CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1988); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1994); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(c) (1988). This notice may be filed before the actual violation has occurred, such as
when a permit will be expiring. Citizens for a Better Env't-Cal. v. Union Oil Co., 861 F.
Supp. 889, 912 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
55 CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1988); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1994); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(b)-(c) (1988).
56 CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1988) (excepting violations of 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1)(B),
(f)(4), or an order of the Administrator under 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)
(1994) (excepting violations of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316, 1317(a)); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(c)
(1988) (excepting violations of Chapter III of RCRA).
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action." These limitations enable citizens to become involved in enforcement
only in cases where the agency is required to act, is on notice of its failure to
do so, and still has failed to initiate any type of enforcement action.5"
Another factor limiting the liability of polluting sources is the ability
of states to restrict standing to bring the claims. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has held that nothing requires a state to extend the same
ability to bring actions as the federal statutes.5 9 Some states have resisted
allowing citizen enforcement actions on a state level.6' For example,
Virginia's limited standing provisions withstood EPA and environmentalist
pressure for several years so that enforcement actions have been extremely
limited.6 Only after years of administrative and court battles have citizens
gained protection.62 Where enforcement may only be brought by the
overburdened agencies, the source's vulnerability to suit is necessarily
decreased.
" Culbertsonv. Coats Am., Inc., No. 94-CV-135-WCO, 1995 WL 739301, at *5 (N.D. Ga.
Dec. 20, 1995) (citing North & South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d
552, 556 (1st Cir. 1991)). Diligence of the government's prosecution will be presumed and is
only overcome "with persuasive evidence that the government has engaged in a pattern of
conduct in its prosecution of the defendant that could be considered dilatory, collusive, or
otherwise in bad faith." Glazer v. American Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029,
1037 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (quoting Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Contract Plating Co., Inc.,
631 F. Supp. 1291, 1293 (D. Conn. 1986)).
" Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found. Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1987).
But see Save Our Bays and Beaches v. City and County of Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098, 1123
n.41 (D. Haw. 1994) (holding an enforcement action only precludes citizen suits if the public
has had a chance for meaningful participation).
" NRDC v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
60 Id.
61 Virginia's CAA Title V stationary source permitting program limits judicial review of
permitting decisions to plaintiffs able to prove a "pecuniary and substantial interest" in the
outcome of the litigation. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1318(B) (Michie 1995). These limitations
are currently being litigated in the federal courts. Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d 517 (4th
Cir. 1996).
62 On April 4, 1996, after the Fourth Circuit had rejected Virginia's constitutional challenges
to the CAA, Governor George Allen signed a bill making it easier for the public to challenge
permits. Allen to Form Environmental Commission, RiCHMOND TIMEs DIsPATCH, Apr. 12,
1996, at B4. Still, Governor Allen vowed to continue the litigation against the CAA. Id. The
standing changes will apply to agency action or review of agency action commenced on or after
July 1, 1996. Administrative Process Act-Application to Certain Agencies, Ch. 573, § 2 (Apr.
4, 1996).
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2. Rationale
The restrictions on citizen suits serve several purposes. By requiring
that the action rest on violation of specific limitations, Congress sought to
avoid having courts engage in "subjective analysis of technological
considerations" during enforcement.63 These restrictions also balance the
environmental interests against the source's need for predictable liability.64
The notice requirements attempt to balance the needs of environmental
protection against the agency's discretion. This interim may allow the
defendant and/or the agency to address the problem so that the lawsuit is
unnecessary.66 Agency inaction is required in order to avoid overburdening
courts 67 and imposing inappropriate penalties if the agency has agreed to
forego penalties where the violator takes "some extreme corrective action"
that it would not otherwise be obligated to take.68
C. Defenses to Liability and Presumptions Favoring the Source
Absolute preemption of private common law nuisance claims where
a facility is operating in compliance with a permit is the broadest of measures
taken to protect polluters from liability. Various other approaches are
adopted by some states in an attempt to balance the competing interests
without stripping landowners of a traditional remedy. Some of these
approaches include recognition of new defenses or innovative remedies,
treatment of the permit as a limitation to possible remedies, 69 and
63 Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 11 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 1993). S. REP.
No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745.
64 Northwest Envtl. Advocates, 11 F.3d. at 911.
65 "The primary purpose of the notice requirement is to inform the federal and state agencies
of the claimed violation, thereby providing them with an opportunity to take their own
enforcement and remedial action if so advised." Mancuso v. New York State Thruway Auth.,
No. 93-CIV-1 145, 1995 WL 753971, at *3 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 31, 1995). See also Culbertson
v. Coats Am., Inc., Nos. 94-CV-135-WCO, 1995 WL 739301, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 1995)
(stating purpose of notice provision is to meet exhaustion requirement).
6 Citizens for a Better Env't-Cal. v. Union Oil Co., 861 F. Supp. 889, 912 (N.D. Cal.
1994).
67 See Glazer v. American Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (ED. Tex.
1995).
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found. Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1987).
Morgan County Concrete Co. v. Tanner, 374 So. 2d 1344 (Ala. 1979) (barring injunctive
relief where defendant is operating in compliance with permit conditions).
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presumptions against the finding of nuisance.
The accountability of polluters is already limited by agency and court
recognition of possible defenses to enforcement actions. These defenses aim
to avoid hardship for good faith industry action.7" Examples of these defenses
include upset,71 bypass,72 and impossibility of performance.73 States aiming
to protect industry interests could enact legislation expressly recognizing
similar defenses to common law actions or by encouraging the use of
innovative remedies to nuisance actions.74 Because the injunctive relief is an
equitable remedy some courts have attempted to arrive at a middle ground
between competing claims.75 The federal courts have followed this example
when faced with injunction requests in instances of environmental harms.76
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals implicitly recognized at least a partial
defense when it held that defendants should be allowed to present evidence
against the injunction or to limit its scope.77 This consideration of competing
claims aims to reconcile private rights with industry's needs.
Industry interests also would be adequately protected by treating proof
.70 See In re Shell Chem. Co., Nos. 85-14, 85-15, 85-16, 1987 WL 120997, at *3 (Oct. 20,
1987). These defenses are not universally recognized. See, e.g., Save Our Bays and Beaches
v. City and County of Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098, 1105 ( D. Haw. 1994) (stating [CWA]
imposes strict liability without allowance for "de minimis" or "rare" violations regardless of the
polluter's good faith).
7' Following enforcement actions against polluters under the CWA for violations created by
random variations of discharges, a minority of federal circuits held that the EPA was required
to utilize variance provisions. In re Shell Chem. Co., Nos. 85-14, 85-15, 85-16, 1987 WL
120997, at *2 (Oct. 20, 1987) (citing Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1266-74 (9th
Cir. 1977), and FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 985-86 (4th Cir. 1976)). EPA responded
by enacting the upset defense providing for protection from liability where the permit violation
was "an exceptional incident in which there is unintentional and temporary noncompliance.
• because of factors beyond the reasonable control of the permittee." In re Shell Chem. Co.,
Nos. 85-14, 85-15, 85-16, 1987 WL 120997, at *2 (Oct. 20, 1987); 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n)
(1995).
72 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(m) (1995).
73 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 593 F.2d 299, 306 (8th Cir. 1979). Cf Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620,633 (D. Md. 1987). This defense was rejected
in regard to CWA permits which are facility-specific. United States v. C.P.S. Chem. Co., 779
F. Supp. 437,454 (E.D. Ark. 1991).
71 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970) (Jasen, J.
dissenting); Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
" Boomer, 257 N.E.2d 870; Spur Indus., Inc., 494 P.2d 700.
76 E.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
" Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir.
1995) (relying on Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 541, 544-45 (1987)).
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of operation under a permit to serve only as a limit to injunctive relief
Alabama courts have gone even further to hold that operation in compliance
with a permit bars injunctive relief 78 Private interests are protected through
the availability of damage awards, environmental interests are protected
through incentives created for industry to reduce pollution to avoid tort
liability, and polluting interests are protected from unexpected shutdowns.79
Another possible approach to balance the competing interests of the
landowner with the polluter might be a presumption of reasonableness and
necessity that must be overcome before a complainant could state a claim of
nuisance."0 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied this approach so that
an oil company operating under a valid permit was not protected if the source
abused the privilege of operation by maintaining an ongoing nuisance."
Oklahoma has also attempted to codify this moderated approach to limiting
liability in certain circumstances.12 The Oklahoma statute provides that "[a]ny
animal feeding operation licensed pursuant to the Oklahoma Feed Yards Act,
§ 9-201, of this title, operated in compliance with such standards, and in
compliance with the regulations made and promulgated by the Board, shall be
deemed to be prima facie evidence that a nuisance does not exist ... ."3
III. EXAMPLES OF BROAD PREEMPTIONS OF NUISANCE CLAIMS FOR
POLLUTION DAMAGE
A. Limiting Nuisance Application to Specified Sources
One approach to limiting private actions only protects selected
industries. Oklahoma legislatures were faced with the dilemma of a
weakening economic base following the decline of the oil industry. 4 In 1993,
in an effort to lure new industry to the state, lawmakers placed substantial
restrictions on the nuisance claims against livestock operations. 5 The
" Morgan County Concrete Co. v. Tanner, 374 So. 2d 1344 (Ala. 1979).
79 Id. at 1347.
80 E.g., Union Oil Co. v. Heinsohn, 43 F.3d 500, 504 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Briscoe v.
Harper Oil Co., 702 P.2d 33 (Okla. 1985)).
81 Id.
82 OKLA. STAT. tit. 2, § 9-210 (1993).
83 Id. at § 9-210B.
' Jean Anne Casey & Colleen Hobbs, Look What the GATT Dragged In, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
21, 1994, at Al7.
85 Id.
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amendment provides for protection of feed yards operating in compliance with
permit terms and regulations and not operating in violation of zoning laws.86
Separate and more sweeping protection is afforded to permitted yards that are
more remotely located so that proof of nuisance requires a showing "by a
preponderance of the evidence that the operation endangers the health or
safety of others.
87
B. Barring Nuisance Actions Against Most Permitted Sources
A second approach to limiting industry liability offers protection to a
much broader range of pollution sources. This approach was recently adopted
in Alaska. Until recently, Alaskan courts and the legislature expanded the
definition and application of private nuisance claims,88 indicating that common
law nuisance applied to injuries caused by pollution. This interpretation by the
Alaskan courts was not affected by the enactment of the state's environmental
protection statute and subsequent regulatory oversight. 89 These statutes
expressly gave citizens the right "to suppress nuisances, to seek damages, or
to otherwise abate or recover for effects of pollution or other environmental
degradation."9'
Beginning in 1991, a class of 120 property owners invoked the
nuisance action to seek injunctive relief and damages for water pollution
caused by a foreign-owned paper mill. 91 During the three years of litigation
that followed, the paper mill was shut down and the parties eventually settled
on the issue of damages so as to avoid further litigation costs.92 However, the
incident caused the Alaskan legislature to substantially limit private nuisance
actions relating to environmentally regulated activities. 93 Only a few months
16 OKLA. STAT. tit. 2, § 9-2 1OB (1993).
87 Id. § 9-21 OC. This section applies to complying feedlots located "more than three miles
outside the incorporated limits of any municipality and which is not located within one mile of
ten or more occupied residences." Id.
11 E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.50.170-09.50.240 (1995). See also Letter from Bruce Botelho,
Alaska Atty. Gen., to Walter Hickel, Governor of Alaska, 1994 WL 779205, at *5 (June 14,
1994).
89 Letter from Grace Schaible, Alaska Atty. Gen., to Mike Davis, Alaska State Legislator,
1988 WL 249507 (Aug. 3, 1988).
90 ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.870(c) (1995).
9 Natali Bendavid, Edwards et al. v. Alaska Pulp Corp., LEGAL TIMEs, Oct. 24, 1994, at 16.
92 Id.
" Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.230 (1995).
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before the settlement, the state's private nuisance statute was amended so that
private nuisance actions were prohibited for non-radioactive pollution
damages where the emission or discharge was expressly authorized by statute,
regulation, court order, or permits subject to monitoring, review, renewal, or
the Alaska Coastal Management Program.94 The effect of this amendment is
to create a blanket preemption of any common law remedies protecting
affected landowners' interests.
C. Absolute Prohibition of Nuisance Claims for Permitted Sources
Under Ohio law, the nuisance doctrine had been interpreted as
including "anything which 'endangers life or health, gives offense to the
senses, violates the laws of decency, or obstructs the reasonable and
comfortable use of property."' 95 However, Ohio's application of the nuisance
doctrine in light of state regulation led to widespread preclusion of the public
nuisance claim in that state. 96 Ohio courts developed protection for all types
of "legalized activity"'97 and reasoned that actions sanctioned by the law could
not also be a public nuisance.98 Over time, the courts expanded this reasoning
to bar claims proceeding on strict liability nuisance theories even in cases
involving abnormally dangerous activities.99
In 1992, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the First District held that the
application of strict liability is inappropriate "where the public policy of Ohio
has clearly chosen to allow operators ... to do business in this state subject
to limitations imposed under .. a comprehensive and vigilant regulatory
scheme."'" This preclusion of claims, however, also was applied outside the
area of strict liability so that even an action that may have been a common law
nuisance is no longer an actionable tort-especially where a set of legislative
acts or administrative regulations governing the details of the conduct
exists.' The court ruled that this decision applied equally to public and
4 ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.230 (1995).
9' MHE Assocs. v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:93CV1 883, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5808, at *7 (N.D. Ohio filed Mar. 24, 1995) (citing Harris v. City of Findlay, 18
N.E.2d 413 (Ohio App. 1938)).
96 State ex rel. Brown v. Rockside Reclamation, Inc., 351 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 1976).
9' See Allen Freight Lines v. Consolidated Rail, 595 N.E.2d 855, 856-57 (Ohio 1992).
9' City of Mingo Junction v. Sheline, 196 N.E. 897, 900 (Ohio 1935).
99 State ex rel. Schoener v. Board of County Comm'rs, 619 N.E.2d 2, 6 (Ohio App. 1992).
100 Id.
101 Brown v. County Comm'rs, 622 N.E.2d 1153, 1159 (Ohio App. 1993).
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private nuisance claims. °2 Only a qualified private nuisance was held to
remain available for landowner claims so that a licensed and regulated
operation would be liable for nuisance when the complainant established
negligence on the part of the defendant."0 3
However, four months later the Ohio Supreme Court rejected its
earlier holding after the state amended the licensing statute by allowing
nuisance actions to suppress pollution.0 4 Still, two dissenting judges argued
that the comprehensive regulatory structure preempted the claims. 0 '
IV. IMPACT OF BLANKET PREEMPTIONS OF CLAIMS AGAINST PERMITTED
SOURCES
Provisions which limit the ability of individuals to protect their
interests where the polluter is operating in compliance with a permit create a
gap in the scheme for environmental protection and unnecessarily harm
private landowners. The existing limitations provided by citizen suits and
permit-shield rules already strike the appropriate balance between industrial
interests and environmental protection.0 6 Given the broad application of
these permit-shields the balance is in favor of industry.
The combined effect of these existing limitations with the blanket
preemption of the nuisance remedy is destruction of the delicate balance of
interests. Where the common law deterred harmful activity in the past by
imposing liability for pollution, now all but the most egregious pollution will
go unchecked until severely overburdened agencies are able to address the
issue through regulations and translate them into each polluting facility's
permit standards. This unaccountability risks creating conditions that are less
controlled than they were prior to the environmental protection awakening of
the 1960s and 1970s. There will no longer be any adequate limiting actions
to polluters where private nuisance damages and injunctions were formerly
available.
102 Id. at 1160.
103 Id.
"o4 Atwater Township Trustees v. B.F.I. Willowcreek Landfill, 617 N.E.2d 1089 (Ohio 1993)
(reversing State ex rel. Brown v. Rockside Reclamation, Inc., 351 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 1976)).
105 Atwater Township Trustees 617 N.E.2d at 1093.
106 See In re Shell Chem. Co., Nos. 85-14, 85-15, 85-16, 1987 WL 120997 (Oct. 20, 1987);
Union Oil Co. v. Heinsohn, 43 F.3d 500, 504 (10th Cir. 1994). See supra notes 22-42.
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A. Over-Reliance on Agency Control
The primary defect with these blanket preemptions is an unjustified
reliance on the agency or other government agents to protect the public's
interests. This defect is demonstrated clearly by a worst-case scenario of
having no regulatory limitation to act as a safety net for environmental
protection. This is precisely the state of circumstances formerly found with
livestock operations in Oklahoma. "Officials at every state and Federal
agency charged with protecting the air and water agree that the Oklahoma
Department of Agriculture is in charge of regulating feedyards and their
application of animal waste."1 °7 However, in 1991 that department enacted
a rule repealing any regulations applicable to these facilities' operations.0's
For approximately three years replacement rules were not adopted.1"9
Abolition of the private nuisance claim coupled with the repeal of livestock
feeding regulations left a tremendous gap in the operations' liability for
harmful actions.
Permit-shield rules have been interpreted as protecting polluters from
enforcement of subsequently enacted regulations.11 ° The few available
exceptions to these permit-shield rules have been strictly interpreted by both
courts and agencies.' For example, the exception permitting actions for
noncompliance with requirements that become effective by statute does not
include regulations promulgated by the agency pursuant to a statute requiring
the Administrator to set standards governing previously permitted facilities. 112
The ramifications of this narrow analysis suggest that if a pollution
problem is serious enough to warrant controls, but does not rise to the level
of a pending catastrophe (which would allow the agency to overcome the
permit-shield rule), the legislature itself must directly set the control standards
or allow the harm to continue unchecked. The already overburdened
legislature that lacks the agency's particularized expertise, must create the
regulation, rather than delegate the authority to do so, in order to bind the
existing sources.1 Thus, prohibiting actions that impose common law
107 Casey & Hobbs, supra, note 83, at A17.
108 Id.
"o Id. Current regulations have been issued at OKLA. REG. § 35:30-35-9 (1995).
"0 In re Envtl. Waste Control, Inc., RCRA Appeal No. 92-93, 1994 WL 200540, at *18
(May 13, 1994).
11 See, e.g., id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
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liability will reopen gaps left in the statutory scheme where either the agency
or legislature have not been able to enact protection.
Also, the ability to participate or attack the validity of a permit is not
adequate protection of the individual's rights where state legislation regarding
the scope of citizen involvement in the permitting process limits participation.
For example, until July 1, 1996, Virginia has limited standing to challenge any
agency permitting or enforcement action to those parties "aggrieved by" the
regulation or decision. 4 Where courts have been willing to construe such
standing provisions narrowly, the result has been that affected landowners are
cut out of the process altogether." 5 Although the EPA's policy has been to
encourage citizen participation, if the state has elected to restrict public
involvement, changing the state's position has proved very difficult." 6
Reliance on regulators to solely look after the interests of the public
creates a potential opportunity for disregard of the public's interests as the
regulator and source develop a relationship. Also, the possibility of "capture"
of the agency" 7 by the interests it seeks to regulate demonstrates that agency
control is not an acceptable proxy for individual remedies." 8 This potential
for bureaucratic disregard of public interests will be increased significantly by
proposed provisions of the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1995, allowing
local government employees or officials to serve as members of boards that
approve discharge permit applications, notwithstanding a prohibition on
membership for persons who have received a significant portion of income
from permit holders or applicants." 9 Because the proposal would remove the
previous safeguard barring conflicts of interest, the persons approving
... VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:16 (Michie 1993). See supra, note 60, 61 and accompanying
text.
' Citizens for Clean Air v. Virgina ex rel. State Air Pollution Control Bd., 412 S.E.2d 715
(Va. App. 1991).
..6 See Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d 517 (1996).
"' See, e.g., Penny Mintz, Transportation Alternatives Within the Clean Air Act: A History
of Congressional Failure to Effectuate and Recommendations for the Future, 3 N.Y.U. ENvn.
L.J. 156 (1994). The relationship arises due to movement between government and private
industry workers and agency dependency on industry for resources, information, and political
support, so that "[t]he inevitable result of such close interaction is that the regulated
community's position ... receives closer attention from the regulators." Id. at 192. See also
Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1109 (1954) (noting the origins of "agency capture" as early as the nineteenth century railroad
commissions).
118 See Gonzalez v. Whitaker, 643 P.2d 274, 278 (N.M. App. 1982).
,19 CWA Amendments of 1995, H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1995).
1996] 417
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
operating permits and designating discharge limitations will be more likely to
advance the polluters interests, rather than those of the affected public.
The lack of landowner protection resulting from a current dearth in
regulatory oversight is exacerbated by the lack of resources available to
agencies. As federal legislators propose staggering budget cuts for agency
operations,12 other provisions require the Administrator of the EPA to certify
that for each new regulation's implementation, costs will be covered by
appropriated federal assistance for the states,121 and to place specific
limitations on the allowable use of these funds. 22 Other strains on agency
resources may result from proposed legislation requiring the agency to
compensate landowners whose property is devalued by as little as twenty
percent as a result of regulatory action." The fund for this compensation will
come from each federal agency's operating budget.124  The agency's
enforcement actions will be reduced as greater demands are placed on fewer
funds. 125
Agency officials and permit boards will be unable to meet these new
responsibilities of increased regulation and more frequent permit renewal. In
addition to new workloads created by legislative proposals requiring the
agency to perform reasonable risk-assessment and cost-benefit analysis 126
under the oversight of independent peer-review panels,1 27 the removal of
nuisance will also create a substantial flood of work for overburdened
120 H.R. 1814, 104th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1995). "GOP budget proposals cut funds designated
for environmental enforcement by 25 percent." Gary Lee, GOP Environmental Tactics Scored,
WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1996, at A17.
.2. CWA Amendments of 1995, H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 505 (1995).
122 H.R. 2099, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 66 (1995) (providing that "none of the funds
appropriated under this heading may be made available for the development and implementation
of new or revised effluent limitation guidelines and standards, pretreatment standards, or new
source performance standards under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended").
" Eg., Job Creation & Wage Enhancement Act, H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1 st Sess. § 204 (1994)
(proposing that landowners be compensated for property devaluation of 20% or more); H.R.
925, 104th Cong., 1 st Sess. § 3 (1995) (proposing compensation for devaluation of 20% or
more); S. 605, 104th Cong., 1 st Sess. § 204 (1995) (proposing compensation for devaluation
of 33% or more).
'24 Private Property Rights Legislation, 1995: Hearings on S. 605 Before the Senate
Environment and Public Works Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1995) (statement of Gary
S. Guzy, Deputy General Counsel, EPA).
125 Id.
126 CWA Amendments of 1995, H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (1995).
121 Mary Beth Regan, The G.O.P. 's Guerrilla War on Green Laws, Bus. WK., Dec. 12, 1994,
at 102.
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agencies. Rulemaking duties will increase as a result of the need for stricter
effluent limitations applicable to a larger number of pollutants. Existing limits
will need to be revised to avoid pollution that was previously deterred by the
source's liability to private individuals. 2 ' Since sources will be required to
meet only their permits' requirements to be free of liability it will become
necessary for the facility's permit to embody greater protection. Permitting
responsibilities are therefore likely to increase dramatically because the
duration of the permit will need to be decreased in order to avoid long periods
of unregulated non-compensable harm.
Other practical factors will limit the agency's ability to adequately
protect the public from uncontrolled pollution damage. First, the agency will
not be able to promulgate regulation standards until the harmful effects of the
pollution are discovered and studied.'29 Those parties who are damaged by
these pollutants may not be able to stop pollution when there are no existing
regulations for the polluter to violate. Even when an agency has been able to
develop limiting standards, it is uncertain whether polluters can be compelled
to comply with regulations not contained in the provisions of the issued
permit. 3' Under the existing permit's standards, a nuisance may cause serious
harm. Pollution would be able to continue under long-term permits 3' for as
long as ten years.'32 The EPA has a limited ability to bring actions when a
permit has been issued in order to respond to instances of imminent and
1 Problems of over-reliance on agency enforcement ability will be exacerbated by a possible
move toward reducing the frequency of required public hearings by agencies for reviewing,
modifying, or adopting water quality standards. CWA Amendments of 1995, H.R. 961, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 304 (1995) (expanding time period between public hearings regarding
limitation standards from once every three years to once every five years).
129 F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 73, 74 (3d ed. 1995) (noting difficulties in identifying
pollution sources and impacts).
30 For cases limiting enforcement to permit terms, see In re Envtl. Waste Control, Inc.,
RCRA Appeal No. 92-93, 1994 WL 200540, at * 18 (May 13, 1994); Shell Oil Co. v. EPA,
950 F.2d 741, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1991); and Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 11 (1971). Compare
Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Nos. 94-20461, 95-20227, 1996 WL 11077, at *9 (5th Cir.
Jan. 11, 1996) (stating Congress initially intended to limit citizen suits to dischargers operating
without a permit that was otherwise available but this liability shield lapsed under statutory
language on December 31, 1974 so that polluters are liable under CWA § 1311 (a)). EPA has
also recognized the ability to bring certain citizen suits even where effluent limitations have
never been issued. Id. at *13.
'3' Sierra Club, Nos. 94-20461, 95-20227, 1996 WL 11077, at *13.
2 In re Envtl. Waste Control, Inc., RCRA Appeal No. 92-93, 1994 WL 200540, at *18
(May 13, 1994).
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substantial endangerment to health or environment. However, the private
plaintiff is still without any individual remedy, and agency deterrence may be
too late, given the high threshold of harm allowed before the agency has the
authority to act. 133
B. Lack of Adequate Remedies for Individual Landowners
Removing common law private nuisance actions will also leave
individual landowners without adequate remedies for harm caused by the
polluter. The remaining causes of action are not sufficient to compensate
parties for their injuries. Retrospective relief is unavailable under the
enforcement scheme that has a prospective focus.'34 The primary purpose of
the federal statutes is to prevent and regulate pollution, rather than to
compensate individual property owners harmed by the emissions. 3 ' Even
when citizens overcome the procedural hurdles and permit-shield provisions
to succeed in asserting a citizen enforcement suit, remedies under these
actions only permit awards for reasonable court costs and attorney fees, but
no remedy for personal property damage.' 36
Any attempt to base a claim for property damage on federal common
law is also unlikely to be accepted. Actions filed under federal common law
for pollution arising from a source outside the affected state or under the
federal courts' maritime jurisdiction generally have been held to be preempted
by the comprehensive scheme of federal environmental protection laws.'37
133 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1988) (allowing agency action to avoid "imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment").
114 See Scott, supra note 1, at 378-79.
135 Id.
136 NRDC v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 176 n.34. (D.C. Cir. 1988); S. REP. No. 92- 414, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745; Scott, supra note 1,
at 377.
13' E.g., Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding the CWA preempts the federal
common law claim of nuisance), Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1981) (applying Milwaukee v. Illinois to preempt maritime nuisance
claim); National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water, 869 F.2d 1196, 1200-06 (1988)
(holding CAA preempts claims of nuisance for interstate air pollution); Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1147-48 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp.
1055, 1069 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding RCRA and CERCLA preempt common law nuisance claims
for groundwater pollution), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982). Cf United States v. Waste
Indus. Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding RCRA only preempted federal common
law claims for groundwater pollution but not common law nuisance principles, so that 42
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These cases left the protection of private interests to the source state's
common law when there were gaps left in the federal statutory scheme.,"
Other forms of state common law and statutory actions that remain
available are also inadequate to remedy individual harms. Trespass is another
common law theory frequently used by property owners against polluters.'39
A claim based on trespass may require the plaintiff to prove that the property
has been physically invaded by the pollution. 4 ' "One is subject to liability to
another for trespass... if he intentionally: (a) enters land in the possession of
the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so .... "141 Courts may
also require that some tangible object directly enter the property.14 2 "Some
courts hold that if an intervening force, such as wind or water, carries the
pollutants onto the plaintiff's land, then the entry is not 'direct.' Others define
'object' as requiring something larger or more substantial than smoke, dust,
gas, or fumes." '143 However, under the private nuisance remedy, recovery is
not limited to instances of physical invasion. 141 "[I]t is enough that plaintiffs
can show sufficient obstruction or interference with the use or enjoyment of
the land.' 145
Recovery under state constitutional claims designed to protect the
individual's property rights will be much more difficult. The Alaskan
landowner may file an inverse condemnation claim against the state. 146 The
Alaska statute indicates that polluters who have been protected by the
statutory bar on the private nuisance claim will be required to indemnify the
state for monies paid under these inverse condemnation claims. 4 Although
the state has adopted a very broad definition of a taking to include "damage"
to property, the private landowner will be less likely to recover because
"damage" will require a greater proof of harm than the private nuisance
U.S.C. § 7003 mandated that courts apply the common law principles of nuisance while not
permitting federal common law nuisance claims).
138 International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,497 (1987).
139 See I WILLLIAM H RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.15-. 16 (2d ed. 1986)
140 Id. § 2.15, at 127-28.
14' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
1 1 RODGERS, supra note 139, § 2.15, at 127-28.
143 Id. § 2.15, at 128 (citations omitted).
'4 MIIHE Assocs. v. United Musical Instrments, U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:93CV1883, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5808, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 1995). Private nuisance is a non-trespassory
invasion. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979).
' MHEAssocs., No. 1:93CV1883, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5808, at *8.
146 Cf ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.230(f) (1995).
147 Id.
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standard of interference with use. 48
C. Potentialfor Abuse and Confusion
Eliminating nuisance liability provides substantial opportunities for
abuse and misunderstanding. Unscrupulous industries will be encouraged to
release pollution without any controls until the agency has not only completed
the promulgation of new effluent limitations, but also has been able to
incorporate these standards into the facility's operating permit during the
review and renewal process.
Second, as with the permit-shield provisions, there is substantial
uncertainty as to the scope of preclusion under the statutory blanket
preemption of nuisance. The Alaska statute's language of "expressly
authorized" emissions leaves room for misunderstanding. Other states faced
with claims that pollution was "authorized by law" because the defendant was
operating under a permit have interpreted the language very narrowly. 49
Courts have required that the express terms of the authorizing law, or an
extremely clear implication therein, indicate that the legislature contemplated
the "doing of the very act which occasions the injury." 5' Therefore,
authorization to build a sewage plant was found not to equate with a sanction
of any particular level of odors from that plant.' Accordingly, it is unclear
whether a plaintiff may state a claim of nuisance for harm caused by pollutants
that are not specifically addressed in the source's permits. Courts seeking
guidance as to the language's meaning may turn to evidence of the legislative
intent. This apparent move of the state toward placing limitations on polluter
liability may compel courts to interpret these vague standards to the benefit
of emitting sources and to the further detriment of the private claimant.
D. Contradiction with Intent Underlying Federal Statutory Protection
The legislators who enacted permit-shield rules and the courts who
imposed limitations on citizen suits acted over a safety-net of common law
remedies that were understood to protect private interests in addition to the
'4' See ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 18 (1994); State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820 (Alaska 1976).
141 RODGERS, supra note 139, § 2.12.
150 Varjabedian v. City of Madera, 572 P.2d 43, 47 (Cal. 1977) (quoting Hasserl v. San
Francisco, 78 P.2d 1021, 1022 (1938)).
' Varjabedian, 572 P.2d at 48.
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regulatory law. Limitations on citizen suit actions for enforcement did not
preempt or curtail citizens' rights to seek enforcement or other relief under
any statute or common law."' Even the permit-shield provisions were
enacted with full reliance on continued citizen protection of the environment
through private common law actions because these remedies were specifically
left intact by statute. 1
53
Further evidence of the contradiction between these blanket
preemptions and the intent of federal legislatures is presented by the recent
cries for deregulation. Advocates for the reduction of regulatory action cite
the availability of private nuisance claims to support their arguments that the
federal bureaucracy should be cut back.154 Proponents of requiring
compensation to landowners whose use is denied by an agency have even
written nuisance into the proposed legislation as the distinguishing line for
acceptable regulations."15
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, while there is a need to balance the interests of private
citizens with industry's need for predictable liability, the current protection
afforded by limitations on citizen suits and permit-shield provisions are
adequate measures. Even if there was a need for added certainty, operation
under a permit could serve as limited protection. To apply the permit as an
across-the-broad preclusion of private nuisance remedies unfairly imposes the
burden of industry discharges on the parties harmed by this pollution and
invites abuse from unscrupulous sources.
Any claim that only a blanket preemption of private nuisance claims
is sufficient to avoid inevitable uncertainty concerning liability for sources is
not persuasive. Just as product manufacturers may be liable in tort for
defective products, polluters should be held accountable for the harms their
152 NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
03 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1994); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1988); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(0 (1988).
' Frank Clifford, Bill Would Limit Federal Power over Environment, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 28,
1994, at Al; Private Property Rights Legislation, 1995: Hearings on H.R. 925 Before the Task
Force on Property Rights of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. 177
(statement of James S. Burling, Pacific Legal Foundation).
5 See, e.g., Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act, H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204
(1995); H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1995); S. 605, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204
(1995).
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actions have caused. The law must not permit them to externalize their costs
to their unfortunate neighbors.
